Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 1 of 41

Kitainian	FILE	ED	
	NOV - 4	2505	
JACK L. W.	AGNER, CLERK I ERN DISTRICT DEPUTY CI		ICT COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIV. NO. S-05-2040 EJG CR. NO. S-04-0073 EJG

v.

VICTORINO PEREZ LUVIANO,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY AND CORRECT SENTENCE

Defendant.

14

15

16 |

17 |

18

19 |

20

21

22 II

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

Defendant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a motion to modify and correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the court has determined that the motion may be decided without a hearing and without service on the United States Attorney because the files and records of the case affirmatively show the factual and legal invalidity of defendant's motion. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1989). For the reasons 23 | set forth below, the motion is DENIED. ///

24

111 25 |

2

3 4

5

6

7 I 8

10

11 12

13

14

15 16 II

17

18

19

20

21 |

22 |

23

24

25 26

Background

On October 15, 2004, defendant pled guilty to one count of mail fraud and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1341. He was sentenced February 4, 2005 to a term of 46 months imprisonment and 36 months supervised release and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$169,387. Pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, defendant waived his rights to appeal and collaterally attack his sentence. Now, however, a year after his conviction, and despite the language of his plea agreement, defendant has filed the instant motion seeking to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, couching substantive challenges to his plea and sentence in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.

### Discussion

As part of his plea agreement the defendant agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence and conviction, as well as his right to collaterally attack his plea and sentence, so long as his sentence was consistent with the stipulations contained in the plea agreement concerning sentencing guideline variables. Plea Agreement, 6:25-28, 7:1-24 (attached as Exhibit 1). Defendant's waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable as long as the waiver encompasses the grounds raised in the challenge and is knowingly and voluntarily made. <u>United States v. Joyce</u>, 357 F.3d 921, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding waiver of appellate

1

3

4 5

6 7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23 24

25

26

rights); <u>United States v. DeJarnette</u>, 63 Fed. Appx. 284 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding waiver of appeal and collateral attack).

Here, defendant's waiver is broad and clearly encompasses the collateral attack set out in his § 2255 motion. This is not an instance where the plea agreement provides a limited waiver, listing exceptions in which appellate or post-conviction attacks are contemplated. See e.g. United States v. Aureoles, 2005 WL 661433 (9th Cir., March 22, 2005) (plea agreement expressly reserved right to bring post-conviction attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel)1; United States v. Shimoda, 334 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant retained right to challenge upward departure in collateral attack). In fact, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the guideline stipulations contained in the plea agreement, the only limitation attached to the appeal and collateral attack waiver. Instead of providing a limited waiver, the language of the plea agreement contains a broad, all-encompassing waiver giving up "any right he may have to bring a post-conviction attack on his conviction or his sentence." Plea Agreement, 7:5-6.

Finally, defendant has not alleged or demonstrated that his waiver was either involuntary or unknowing. To the contrary,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Rule 36-3 of the Rules of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, unpublished dispositions are not precedent and may not be cited except in certain limited circumstances. Accordingly, while <u>Aureoles</u> has no precedential value, it is cited because it directly addresses the factual issue raised in the instant case, namely specificity of limited waivers of appellate rights and, therefore, is persuasive authority.

#### Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 4 of 41

defendant admits he made a bad bargain, "detrimentally relying on counsel's advice" and now seeks to set it aside. Defendant's motion, 4:1-3. However, the plea agreement is clear in its expression of the waiver and defendant cannot legitimately contend he did not know the meaning of the waiver where the agreement bears his signature, and he was specifically questioned by the court about his understanding of the waiver during the plea colloquy. Reporter's Transcript of Change of Plea Colloquy, 17:24 - 18:10 (attached as Exhibit 2).<sup>2</sup>

#### Conclusion

Because defendant has waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3 , 2005

EDWARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

22

23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

24

25

While an interpreter was present during the change of plea colloquy, the record is clear that defendant did not need the interpreter's services either during the court hearing or at the time he signed the plea agreement. Reporter's Transcript, 23:17 - 24:7.

McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney MATTHEW STEGMAN Assistant U.S. Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2910

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR. No. S-04-0073 EJG

Plaintiff, ) PLEA AGREEMENT

v.

1

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VICTORINO PEREZ-LUVIANO, MISAEL PINA, and

NELSON SOTO,

Defendants.

DATE: October 15, 2004

TIME: 10:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Edward J. Garcia

I.

#### INTRODUCTION

A. Scope of Agreement: The indictment in this case charges defendant VICTORINO PEREZ-LUVIANO with one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), eight counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and five counts of identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7)). This document contains the complete Plea Agreement between the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California (the "government") and the defendant regarding this case. This Plea Agreement is limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California and cannot bind any other federal, state, or local prosecuting, administrative, or regulatory authorities.

 B. Court Not a Party: The Court is not a party to this Plea Agreement. Sentencing is a matter solely within the discretion of the Court, the Court is under no obligation to accept any recommendations made by the government, and the Court may in its discretion impose any sentence it deems appropriate up to and including the statutory maximum stated in this Plea Agreement. If the Court should impose any sentence up to the maximum established by the statute, the defendant cannot, for that reason alone, withdraw his guilty plea, and he will remain bound to fulfill all of the obligations under this Agreement. The defendant understands that neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the Court can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence will receive.

II.

#### DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- A. Guilty Pleas: The defendant will plead guilty to Count
  Two. The defendant agrees that he is in fact guilty of this charge
  and that the facts set forth in the Factual Basis attached hereto as
  Exhibit A are accurate.
- B. Restitution: The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act requires the Court to order restitution to the victims of certain offenses. In addition to that restitution, the defendant agrees to pay full restitution to the California Employment Development Department in the amount of \$201,260.00. Defendant further agrees that he will not seek to discharge any restitution obligation or any part of such obligation in any bankruptcy proceeding.
- C. Special Assessment: The defendant agrees to pay a special assessment of \$100 at the time of sentencing by delivering a check or money order payable to the United States District Court to the

6

7

9

8

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25

26

27

28

United States Probation Office immediately before the sentencing hearing. If the defendant is unable to pay the special assessment at the time of sentencing, he agrees to earn the money to pay the assessment, if necessary by participating in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

III.

#### THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS

A. Dismissals: The government agrees to move, at the time of sentencing, to dismiss with prejudice the remaining counts in the pending Indictment.

#### Recommendations: В.

- Incarceration Range: The government will recommend that the defendant be sentenced to the low end of the applicable guideline range for his offense as determined by the United States Probation Office.
- 2. Acceptance of Responsibility: If the United States Probation Office determines that a three-level reduction in defendant's offense level for his full and clear demonstration of acceptance of responsibility is appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, the government will not oppose such a reduction.

IV.

#### ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

Elements of the Offense: At a trial, the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements of the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty:

#### Mail Fraud:

First, the defendant made up a scheme or plan for obtaining money or property by making false promises or statements,

Second, the defendant knew that the promises or statements were false;

Third, the promises or statements were material;

Fourth, the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and
Fifth, the defendant used, or caused to be used, the mails to
carry out or attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme.

It does not matter whether the material mailed was itself false or
deceptive so long as the mail was used as a part of the scheme.

٧.

#### MAXIMUM SENTENCE

- A. Maximum Penalty: The maximum sentence which the Court can impose is 20 years of incarceration, a 3 year period of supervised release, a fine of \$250,000, and a special assessment of \$100. By signing this Agreement, the defendant also agrees that the Court can order the payment of restitution for the full loss caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct. The defendant agrees that the restitution order is not restricted to the amounts alleged in the specific counts to which the defendant is pleading guilty. The defendant further agrees that he will not attempt to discharge in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding any restitution imposed by the Court.
- B. Violations of Supervised Release: The defendant understands that if he violates a condition of supervised release at any time during the term of supervised release, the Court may revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve up to 2 additional years imprisonment.

ÝΙ.

#### SENTENCING DETERMINATION

- A. Statutory Authority: The defendant understands that a sentencing guideline range for this case will be determined by the Court pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998). The defendant further understands that the Court will impose a sentence within that guideline range, unless the Court finds that there is a basis for departure (either above or below the range) because there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.
- B. Stipulations Affecting Guidelines Calculation: The government and the defendant agree that there is no material dispute as to the following sentencing guidelines variables and therefore stipulate to the following:
  - 1. 2B1.1(b)(1)(H): This provision applies as the loss amount is more than \$400,000 but less than \$1,000,000. This provision adds 14 points to the base offense level.
  - 2. 2B1.1(b)(8)(C): This provision does not apply to this defendant.
  - 3. 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i): This provision applies as the defendants possessed 5 or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or obtained by the use of, another means of identification.
  - 4. Acceptance of Responsibility: See paragraph III(B)(2) above.
  - No other adjustments, enhancements, or departures are appropriate in this case.

#### VII.

#### WAIVERS

- A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights: The defendant understands that by pleading guilty he is waiving the following constitutional rights: (a) to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea if already made; (b) to be tried by a jury; (c) to be assisted at trial by an attorney, who would be appointed if necessary; (d) to subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf; (e) to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him; and (f) not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
- B. <u>Blakely waiver</u>: To the extent that the defendant might have a right to have any facts that will be used to determine his sentence charged in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant waives those rights, waives a grand jury indictment on those facts, and consents to have the district court find any facts necessary for the imposition of sentence under the applicable lesser standard of proof determined by the guidelines and case law prior to <u>Blakely v. Washington</u>, (June 24, 2004). These sentencing facts would specifically include any facts necessary to decide whether the defendant should be given an upward departure. Defendant also agrees to waive any constitutional challenge to the validity of the federal sentencing guidelines or their application to his case. This waiver is conditioned upon the sentence imposed being in accordance with the parties' guideline stipulations.
- C. Waiver of Appeal and Collateral Attack: The defendant understands that the law gives him a right to appeal his conviction and sentence. He agrees as part of his plea, however, to give up the right to appeal the conviction and the right to appeal any

4 5

6 7

8

9

10

13 14

12

15 16

17 18

19 20

21 22

2324

25

26 27

28

aspect of the sentence imposed in this case as long as his sentence is consistent with the stipulations set forth above about the sentencing guidelines variables. He specifically gives up his right to appeal any order of restitution the Court may impose.

The defendant also gives up any right he may have to bring a post-conviction attack on his conviction or his sentence. He specifically agrees not to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241 attacking his conviction or sentence.

If the defendant's conviction on any of the counts to which he is pleading is ever vacated at the defendant's request, or his sentence is ever reduced at his request, the government shall have the right (1) to prosecute the defendant on any of the counts to which he pleaded guilty; (2) to reinstate any counts that may be dismissed pursuant to this agreement; and (3) to file any new charges that would otherwise be barred by this agreement. decision to pursue any or all of these options is solely in the discretion of the United States Attorney's Office. By signing this agreement, the defendant agrees to waive any objections, motions, and defenses he he might have to the government's decision. In particular, he agrees not to raise any objections based on the passage of time with respect to such counts including, but not limited to, any statutes of limitation or any objections based on the Speedy Trial Act or the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

C. Waiver of Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The defendant agrees to waive all rights under the "Hyde Amendment," Section 617, P.L. 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997), to recover attorneys' fees or other litigation expenses in connection with the charges in the above-

1

4

5 6

8

9 10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25 26

27

28

captioned matter and of any related allegations (including without limitation any charges to be dismissed pursuant to this Agreement and any charges previously dismissed).

#### VIII.

#### ENTIRE PLEA AGREEMENT

Other than this Plea Agreement, no agreement, understanding, promise, or condition between the government and the defendant exists, nor will such agreement, understanding, promise, or condition exist unless it is committed to writing and signed by the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and counsel for the United States.

#### IX.

#### APPROVALS AND SIGNATURES

Defense Counsel: I have read this Plea Agreement and have discussed it fully with my client. The Plea Agreement accurately and completely sets forth the entirety of the agreement. in my client's decision to plead guilty as set forth in this Agreement.

Attorney for Defendant

**Defendant:** I have read this Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand it, and I voluntarily agree to it. Further, I have consulted with my attorney and fully understand my rights with respect to the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines which may apply to my case. No other promises or inducements have been made to me, other than those contained in this Agreement. In addition, no one has threatened or forced me in

# Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 13 of 41

	•
1	any way to enter into this Plea Agreement. Finally, I am satisfied
2	with the representation of my attorney in this case.
3	
4	DATED: VICTORINO PEREZ-LUVIANO.
5	Defendant
6	C. Court Certified Interpreter/Translator: I declare that I
7	am a court certified Spanish-English interpreter/translator. On
8	, I read the entire contents of the foregoing plea
9	agreement to Nelson Soto, the defendant, translating the document
11	from English to Spanish.
12	DATED: Interpreter/Translator
13	
14	D. Attorney for United States: I accept and agree to this
15	Plea Agreement on behalf of the government.
16	DATED: 19.15.04 McGREGOR W. SCOTT United/States Attorney
17	AAA MAATA
18	By: (V (A) / (V)
19	Assistant U.S. Attorney
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	

## 2

3

5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22 23

24

25

261 27

28

#### EXHIBIT "A"

#### Factual Basis for Plea

Last year, thousands of names and corresponding employee information was stolen from Paychex, a payroll company, in Southern California. Fraudulent unemployment benefit applications had been filed with the California Employment Development Department (EDD) under the names of a number of these people. The employees, at the time of the applications, did not apply for these benefits.

Defendant Victorino Perez-Luviano, along with co-defendants Misael Pina and Nelson Soto, had been receiving these fraudulently obtained benefits checks at 49 West 11th Street, Apartment #B, Pittsburg, California, 3262 Denver Avenue, Apartment #7, Merced, California, and United States Post Office Boxes 21, 1011, and 1291 in French Camp, California.

Nelson Soto and Misael Pina were seen retrieving EDD unemployment benefit checks from the post office boxes on three separate dates in November and December 2003, and January 2004.

On February 11, 2004, during a search pursuant to warrant at 49 West 11th Street, Apartment #B, in Pittsburg, California, evidence of the fraudulent claims was found, including EDD Unemployment Insurance claim documents, post office box keys, documents containing numerous names and social security numbers believed to belong to true individuals, and seven false identification documents to include two Social Security cards, four resident alien cards, and one California Driver's license. Misael Pina was at the residence and was arrested. Misael Pina waived Miranda and said the other person obtaining the checks was Nelson Soto and told agents where Soto lived. During the time agents were at Misael Pina's residence, he received a phone call from Victorino Perez-Luviano on Pina's

cellular telephone.

Nelson Soto was contacted at his residence. Nelson Soto identified "Sapo" as Misael Pina's partner in this scheme. During a consent search of Nelson Soto's residence, fraudulent EDD Unemployment Insurance claims documents and a fraudulent California driver's license were found.

Nelson Soto stated that he had driven to Los Angeles,
California, with Misael Pina and "Sapo" in "Sapo's" car to purchase
papers with Social Security numbers, names, and other personal
identification information. He indicated that the information was
obtained on a print-out which was approximately an inch thick. He
also claimed that "Sapo" used the social security numbers to request
EDD unemployment insurance claims.

Nelson Soto waived Miranda and said that "Sapo" was the individual to whom Misael Pina had always surrendered the fraudulent EDD checks to. He claimed that "Sapo" would give Misael Pina cash for the EDD checks. Nelson Soto indicated that he received \$50.00 to \$200.00 each time he helped retrieve checks for Misael Pina. Victorino Perez-Luviano is Sapo.

On February 20, 2004, agents searched Victorino Perez-Luviano's residence and vehicles in Merced, California, pursuant to search warrant. During the search of the residence and vehicles, the following items were found: fraudulent EDD Unemployment Insurance claims documents, a post office box key, two receipts for rentals of post office boxes to which fraudulently received EDD checks were sent, documents containing numerous names and social security numbers believed to belong to true individuals, and three false identification documents including two fake social security cards

## Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 16 of 41

and one fake California ID card with the picture of Victorino Perez-Luviano in the name of "Victor Perez".

Victorino Perez-Luviano waived his Miranda rights and said that Misael Pina asked him to use his home address to receive fraudulently obtained EDD checks. He said Misael Pina paid him \$100 every time Pina picked up checks.

The total money obtained from EDD by this fraud, determined as of the date of this plea, was \$201,260.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

--000--

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VŠ.

CASE NO.: CR S-04-073

VICTORINO PEREZ-LUVIANO,

Defendant.

--000--

#### REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

Friday, October 15, 2004

Held in United States District Court, Eastern District of California, before the HONORABLE EDWARD J. GARCIA on Friday, October 15, 2004, 10:27 a.m.

PLAINTIFF:

McGREGOR W. SCOTT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 501 I Street, #10-100

Sacramento, California 95814

BY: MATTHEW STEGMAN, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

DEFENDANT: NICHOLAS F. REYES

ATTORNEY AT LAW

Reported by:

Keli Rutherdale, CSR No. 10084

## EXHIBIT 2

## DIAMOND COURT REPORTERS

120 I Street, 2nd Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 498-9288

advise Counsel that I was going to change the trial date on this case. And in anticipation that the other case will go, I think that's the best thing to do.

MR. STEGMAN: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

l

MR. STEGMAN: We came in here -- at least the Government came in here expecting to go to trial. However, it appears that we may have a plea agreement to go forward on today.

The plea agreement is the same one that was submitted to this Court prior to the last status conference, with one change being the loss amount.

THE COURT: Before you give me the change, I'll find it in my personal notes, to continue with your statement.

MR. STEGMAN: And so we were hoping that if, in fact, there will be a plea this morning, if we can go forward with that plea.

THE COURT: Mr. Reyes?

MR. REYES: Mr. Stegman is accurate. There will be some stipulations regarding parole, loss quantity amounts, which we were always at loss at to be able to determine based on the discovery.

We are prepared to enter a plea. If the Court would either trail us to the afternoon, if the Court wants

## Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 20 of 41 to do it today. I know we still have time within the clock, 1 but based on the offer relayed today, the changes made 2 today, we have an agreement. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go over it right now. Let 4 5 me find the prior agreement in my notes. MR. STEGMAN: May I? 6 MR. REYES: There are changes, your Honor. 7 might be more worthy --8 THE COURT: Let me find the other one first, then 9 10 you can tell me about the changes. Yes, Mr. Stegman, you can you pass forward the plea 11 12 agreement. 13 (Pause in proceeding.) THE COURT: I was prepared to advise Counsel the 14 15 district courts and circuit courts throughout the country are all over the place in connection with enhancements, 16 whether it's unconstitutional to even plead them in a 17 superseding indictment. 18 I've read two cases this morning where the district 19 20 judge held it was unconstitutional to supersede an indictment with enhancements because enhancements are not 21 crimes. 22 And in one of those cases, the trial judge struck 23 the enhancements as surplusage, whether they are prejudicial 24 or not. In any event, we may get beyond that problem right 25

## Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 21 of 41 now. I was going to ask Counsel to brief that out. 1 MR. REYES: I think the enhancements as alleged, 2 basically, on this plea agreement would be gone, your Honor, 3 other than, I think, one on the issue of victims. 4 5 (Pause in proceeding.) THE COURT: One of my notes says that on July 16 of 6 this year the Defendant offered to plead quilty straight up 7 to the sheet, fourteen counts. If -- that's changed, I take 8 it? 9 10 MR. STEGMAN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay, hold on. Let me see if I can 11 find it. 12 (Pause in proceeding.) 13 MR. STEGMAN: Your Honor, may I? It may be that 14 the Defendant got cold feet prior to the last hearing just 15 before we were going to submit the plea agreement to the 16 Court, but the Court never got the plea agreement. 17 THE COURT: It was before that? 18 MR. STEGMAN: It would have been --19 THE COURT: What was the date of the proposed plea 20 agreement, prior plea agreement? 21 MR. REYES: We never signed the plea agreement, 22 23 your Honor. 24 THE COURT: I'm talking about the date it appeared 25 on calendar?

THE COURT: The record will show all the proper 1 parties are again before the Court in case number 04-0073, 2 U.S. v Victorino Perez-Luviano. 3 The matter was scheduled for trial confirmation hearing this morning. The trial was scheduled to commence 5 October 25; however, earlier this morning on calendar in 6 open court, I was advised that the parties had reached a 7 plea agreement. 8 Has that been agreed now, Mr. Stegman? 9 MR. STEGMAN: Yes, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: You agree, Mr. Reyes? 11 12 MR. REYES: I believe so, your Honor. You can ask the Defendant. He may have some questions. 13 THE DEFENDANT: I want him to tell me what the law 14 is on what kind of time I am going to do. 15 16 MR. REYES: I think he said lid, 1-i-d. THE INTERPRETER: Lid. I don't know. I want to 17 18 know how much time I am going to do. 19 MR. REYES: Your Honor, if I may interject? 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MR. REYES: I've explained to him the guideline 22 ranges and the sentencing, the Court not being a party, and 23 we've done the best we can with the guidelines but nothing promised other than --24

THE COURT: What I want you to do, Mr. Perez, is

listen carefully because I am going to review the essential elements of the plea agreement that I understand you signed.

Do you understand me?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So you listen to everything I say.

As I understand the plea agreement, which has been signed by the Defendant, first of all, the Court is not a party to the agreement. The Defendant offers to plead guilty to Count Two, mail fraud, and agrees to pay full restitution in the amount of two hundred one thousand two hundred sixty dollars.

The Defendant also agrees to waive application of the Supreme Court decision Blakely v Washington to this case and waives any constitutional challenge to the validity of the federal sentencing guidelines or their application to this case.

This Blakely waiver is conditioned upon the sentence imposed being in accordance with the parties' guideline stipulations.

The Defendant also agrees to waive appeal and collateral attack of the conviction and sentence.

(Pause in proceeding.)

THE COURT: And the Defendant also agrees to waive all rights under the so-called Hyde Amendment, to recover attorney fees or other litigation expenses in connection

with the charges in the indictment.

In return, the Government agrees to move, at the time of sentencing, to dismiss with prejudice the remaining counts in the pending indictment, and the Government will recommend that the Defendant be sentenced at the low end of the applicable guideline range as determined by the probation officer.

And if the U.S. Probation Office recommends a three-level reduction in Defendant's offense level for the Defendant's acceptance of responsibility, the Government will not oppose such a reduction.

And the Defendant, along with the Government, stipulates to the following guideline calculations: That the loss amount is more than four hundred thousand but not less than one million dollars --

MR. STEGMAN: Your Honor, "...but less than," I'm sorry.

THE COURT: "...but less than one million dollars," yes, you are correct.

And that the Defendant possessed five or more means of identification that unlawfully were produced from or obtained by the use of another means of identification, so that Guideline Section 2B1.1, subdivision (b)(9)(c)(1) applies, and that the Defendant accepts responsibility if the probation officer so recommends.

## Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 26 of 41 1 In addition to that the parties stipulate that no 2 other enhancements apply in the case. 3 Is that essentially the plea agreement, then, Mr. 4 Stegman? MR. STEGMAN: Yes, your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Reyes? 7 MR. REYES: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And you've discussed this with the 8 9 Defendant and that's what he wants to do? 10 MR. REYES: Yes, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Perez? Is that 12 what you want to do? Change your plea to guilty to Count Two of the indictment, which charges mail fraud, with those 13 understandings? 14 (Discussion off the record.) 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Before accepting your guilty plea, 17 there are a number of questions I will ask you to ensure 18 that it is a valid plea, and I will have you sworn to tell 19 the truth for that purpose. 20 If you do not understand any of the questions or at 21 22 any time wish to consult with your attorney, please say so, 23 since it is important to a valid plea that you understand each question before you answer. 24

Ms. Clerk, please swear the Defendant.

THE CLERK: Mr. Perez, do you swear you will answer truthfully the questions which are asked of you concerning your entry of plea, so help you God?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you understand that having been sworn, your answers to my questions will be subject to the penalties of perjury or making a false statement if you do not answer truthfully?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I wish to advise you that you will be sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines and I cannot now predict what your actual sentence will be.

If I accept your plea of guilty this morning, your case will be referred to the U.S. Probation Office for a report and recommendation, after which I will determine your sentence.

Until I receive that report, I simply don't know enough about you, your background, or the details and circumstances of the offense to which you are offering to plead guilty to predict what your actual sentence might be.

Therefore, I advise you that if you plead guilty, you may be sentenced to a term higher than your attorney may be predicting or to the maximum term, and if your attorney is making a mistake in guideline computations, that will not form a basis for you to withdraw your guilty plea.

property and obtain money and property from the state of California and from others by means of materially false and fraudulent pretense -- representations, pretenses, and promises.

And that on or about November 18th, 2003, in the Eastern District of California and elsewhere, for the purposes of executing the scheme and artifice to defraud or aiding and abetting and attempting to do so, you and others knowingly caused the following item to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter to be sent and delivered by the United States Postal Service and knowingly caused it to be delivered by the United States Postal Service according to the directions there on November 18th, 2003, an EDD check made payable to Maria Galvon and mailed by state of California to Post Office Box 1011, French Camp, California, 95231-1011.

Mr. Stegman, would you advise the Defendant of the essential elements you would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to convict the Defendant of this offense.

MR. STEGMAN: Yes, your Honor.

(Pause in proceeding.)

MR. STEGMAN: At trial the Government will prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements of the offense of mail fraud:

#### Case 2:04-cr-00073-EJG Document 64 Filed 11/04/05 Page 31 of 41

defraud.

First, that the Defendant made up a scheme or plan for obtaining money or property by making false promises or statements.

Second, the Defendant knew that promises or statements were false.

Third, the promises or statements were material.

Four, the Defendant acted with the intent to

And fifth, the Defendant used or caused to be used the mail to carry out or attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme.

It does not matter whether the material mail was false or deceptive, as long as the mail was used as part of the scheme.

THE COURT: Mr. Perez, did you hear and understand the statement of the Prosecutor of the essential elements that he would have to prove at a trial to convict you of this offense?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: That offense is punishable by up to twenty years imprisonment, a three-year period of supervised release, a fine of up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars, a special assessment of one hundred dollars, and the Court can order you to pay restitution for the full amount where the full loss was caused by your wrongful conduct.

Yes.

\_\_\_\_\_\_

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT: And do you understand you cannot be convicted of this charge unless all twelve jurors agreed on your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If I accept your guilty plea to this charge this morning, there will be no trial; that is, by pleading guilty you are giving up your right to a jury trial, your right to confront and question the witnesses against you, and your right to remain silent and not incriminate yourself.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Other than what has been said here in open court or that may appear in your written plea agreement, has anyone made you any other promises in connection with penalty or punishment to get you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Have you or anyone you know been threatened, in any way, to get you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: As part of your plea agreement you agree to waive or give up your rights to appeal or

THE COURT: And are you pleading guilty to this 1 2 charge freely and voluntarily, with the advice of your attorney, and because, in fact, you are guilty of this 3 offense? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The advice of my attorney. 6 THE COURT: Let me read to you that question again. 7 Are you pleading guilty to this charge freely and voluntarily, with the advice of your attorney, and because, 8 9 in fact, you are guilty of this offense? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Because I'm quilty and my 10 attorney advised me that that is the best thing for me to do 11 12 also. THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Hitt, will you please 13 advise the Court of a factual basis. 14 MR. STEGMAN: Yes, your Honor. Mr. Stegman. 15 16 THE COURT: Mr. Stegman. 17 MR. STEGMAN: Last year, thousands of names and corresponding employee information was stolen from Paychex, 18 a payroll company, in Southern California. Fraudulent 19 20 unemployment benefit applications had been filed with the California Employment Development Department, or EDD, under 21 the names of a number of these people. The employees, at 22 the time of the applications, did not apply for these 23

19

Defendant Victorino Perez-Luviano, along with

benefits.

24

co-defendants Misael Pina and Nelson Soto, had been receiving these fraudulently-obtained benefit checks at apartments in Pittsburgh, California, and Merced, California, and three United States Post Office boxes in French Camp, California.

Nelson Soto and Misael Pina were seen retrieving the EDD checks from the Post Office boxes on three dates in November and December 2003 and January 2004.

On February 11, 2004, during a search pursuant to warrant at the Pittsburgh apartment, evidence of the fraudulent claims were found, including EDD Unemployment Insurance Claim documents, Post Office box keys, documents containing numerous names and Social Security numbers believed to belong to true individuals, and seven false identification documents, including two Social Security cards, four resident alien cards, and one California driver's license.

Misael Pina was at the residence and was arrested.

After waiving Miranda he said the other person obtaining the checks was Nelson Soto, and told the agents where Mr. Soto lived. While at Misael Pina's house, they received a phone call from Victorino Perez-Luviano on Pina's cell phone.

Nelson Soto was contacted at his residence and identified "Sapo" as Misael Pina partner in the scheme. During a consent search of Mr. Nelson Soto's residence,

fraudulent EDD Unemployment Insurance Claims documents and a fraudulent Californía driver's license were found.

Nelson Soto stated that he had driven to Los

Angeles, California, with Misael Pina and "Sapo" in "Sapo's"

car to purchase papers with Social Security numbers and

other information. He indicated that the information was

obtained on a printout, which was approximately an inch

thick, and claimed that "Sapo" used the Social Security

numbers to request EDD unemployment insurance claims.

Nelson Soto waived Miranda and said that "Sapo" was the individual to whom Misael Pina had always surrendered the fraudulent EDD checks to. He claimed that "Sapo" would give Misael Pina cash for the EDD checks. Nelson Soto indicated he received fifty dollars to two hundred dollars each time he helped retrieve checks for Misael Pina. Victorino Perez-Luviano is Sapo.

On February 20th, 2004, agents searched Victorino
Perez-Luviano's apartment and vehicles pursuant to search
warrant. During the search of vehicles and the residence,
the following items were found: Fraudulent EDD Unemployment
Insurance Claims documents, a Post Office box key, two
receipts for rentals of Post Office boxes to which
fraudulently-received EDD checks were sent, documents
containing numerous names and Social Security numbers
believed to belong to true individuals, and three false

l

identification documents, including two fake Social Security cards and one fake California I.D. card with a picture of Victorino Perez-Luviano in the name of "Victor Perez".

Victorino Perez-Luviano waived his Miranda rights and said that Misael Pina asked him to use his home address to receive fraudulently-obtained EDD checks. He said Misael Pina paid him one hundred dollars every time Pina picked up checks.

The total money obtained from EDD by this fraud, determined as of the date of this plea, was two hundred one thousand two hundred sixty dollars.

THE COURT: Mr. Perez, as far as your personal conduct is concerned, did you hear and understand the statements of the prosecutor?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that what you did?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: The Defendant's plea of guilty is accepted and the judgment of guilty is hereby entered. The Court finds that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty, that the Defendant understands the nature of the charge and consequences of the plea, that the Defendant understands his constitutional rights, and that the Defendant's plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily made.

This matter will now be referred to the U.S.

23

24